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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Adam Jon Barth appeals from the district court's order revoking probation and
executing the sentence previously imposed upon Barth's conviction for felony injury
to child.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2012, 14-year old M.C. disclosed to authorities that she had been involved
in a dating relationship with 21-year old Barth.

(R., pp.13-17.)

The relationship

started after Barth met M.C. and told her that he was 16 years old. (R., p.17.) M.C.
told authorities that in the course of the relationship, Barth touched her buttocks and
breasts, and solicited her to have sex with him on two occasions. (R., pp.20-21.)
M.C. also reported that, upon Barth's request, she sent him a photo of herself in her
underwear, and that Barth sent a photo of his penis to her. (R., p.17.)
The state charged Barth with two counts of sexual abuse of a child under 16.
(R, pp.59-61.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Barth pleaded guilty to an amended
charge of felony injury to child.

(R., pp.81-95.)

A psychosexual evaluation

conducted on Barth prior to sentencing concluded that Barth was a high risk to reoffend, and that he was not amendable to sexual offender treatment. (PSI, pp.5354.1) Barth reported to the presentence investigator that he had been diagnosed
with "bipolar disorder, PTSD, possible head injury, and ADHD." (PSI, p.74.) The
"PSI" page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"Supreme Court No. 42703 Adam Barth Confidential 1Ex_hibits." This file contains
Barth's PSI, as well as various evaluations and other exhibits submitted by the
parties during the course of the underlying criminal proceedings.
1
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presentence investigator opined that Barth was "not a candidate for probation at this
time." (PSI, p.77.) The district court imposed a unified six-year sentence with two
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for one year. (R., pp.113-119.)
A rider report submitted to the court by the Idaho Department of Correction
stated that Barth was "not capable of doing the abstract thinking required to make
progress" in the sex offender treatment program.

(PSI, p.171.)

The report also

described numerous disciplinary sanctions Barth received, and concluded that Barth
would be "unmanageable on probation." (PSI, pp.174-177.) At the conclusion of the
period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the originally-imposed
sentence and placed Barth on probation for five years.

(R, pp.132-135.)

As a

special condition of probation, the court ordered that Barth be transported to the
custody of the Safe Haven living facility in Blackfoot. (Id.)
Approximately two months later, the state filed a report of probation violation
alleging that Barth violated his probation by being evicted from the Safe Haven
facility for failing to follow facility rules. (R., pp.146-150.) Barth admitted violating
his probation in the manner alleged by the state, and the district court revoked and
reinstated Barth's probation. (R., pp.177-183.) The district court further ordered that
Barth's residence would be determined by Barth's probation officer. (R., p.180.)
Approximately three months later, the state filed another report of probation
violation. (R., pp.184-194.) The state alleged that Barth violated his probation by:
(1) possessing a pipe with a burnt residue and a baggie containing a green leafy
substance, both of which tested positive for synthetic cannabis, (2) being discharged
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from required sex offender treatment for inappropriately touching a staff member;
and (3) possessing a knife in his living facility. (Id.)
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Barth admitted violating his probation by
possessing synthetic cannabis.

(6/24/14 Tr., p.9, L.20 - p.11, L.8.)

At the

conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Barth also violated
his probation by being discharged from sex offender treatment for engaging in
inappropriate conduct. (6/24/14 Tr., p.60, L.14- p.66, L.17.) The district court found
that the state failed to prove that Barth possessed a knife in violation of his
probation. (6/24/14 Tr., p.60, Ls.4-12.)
Prior to disposition, the district court granted Barth's request that he be
ordered to undergo a neuropsychological evaluation. (6/24/14 Tr., p.66, L.22 - p.72,
L.18; R., pp.244-245.)

The neuropsychological evaluator concluded that Barth's

psychological issues were likely not caused by a head injury, but instead were
"predominantly a combination of his neurodevelopmental issues (Asperger's
spectrum) combined with his psychiatric issues that combine to create significant
deficits in his reasoning and problem solving." (PSI, pp.328-329.) Also prior to the
disposition hearing, the state submitted numerous disciplinary reports documenting
Barth's continued violations of inmate rules committed while he was incarcerated
following his arrest on the probation violation. (PSI, pp.215-315, 340-381.)
At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the district court revoked Barth's
probation and ordered the originally imposed sentence to be executed. (R., pp.253257; 10/7/14 Tr., p.93, L.10 - p.102, L.7.)

3

The district court later denied Barth's

LC.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., pp.258-283.) Barth timely appealed.
(R., pp.284-288.)

4

ISSUES
Barth states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether the district court erred by applying the wrong standard
during its evaluation of Mr. Barth's claim that one of the alleged
probation violations was not willful.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it decided
it did not have the authority to tailor the terms of probation to Mr.
Barth's individual needs.

(Appellant's brief, p.13)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Barth failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation?

2.

Has Barth failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Barth Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking
His Probation

A.

Introduction
Barth contends that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his

probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-22.) Specifically, Barth contends that the district
court erred by: (1) applying an outdated legal standard, rather than I.C.R. 33(f), to
determine whether it could revoke Barth's probation regardless of whether his
probation violations were willful; and (2) failing to recognize the scope of its
discretion to tailor the terms of probation to meet Barth's individual needs.

(Id.)

Barth's claims fail because a review of the record reveals that the district court acted
well within its discretion in revoking Barth's probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State

v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Drennen,
122 Idaho 1019, 1021, 842 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1992).

"When a trial court's

discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multitiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue
as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason."

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333

(1989).

6

"[A] district court's finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding." State v. Sanchez,
149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009). An appellate court will accept the
district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous but "may freely
review the district court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts
found."

kl at 104, 233 P.3d at 35 (citations omitted).

"The construction and application of legislative enactments and, by analogy,
court rules are questions of law over which [this Court] exercise[s] free review."
Hansen v. State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion With Respect To The
Probation Violation Allegation That Barth Was Discharged From Sex Offender
Treatment
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v.
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,325,834 P.2d 326,327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,115
Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989). When deciding whether to
revoke probation, the district court must consider "whether the probation [was]
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the protection of
society." Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1022, 842 P.2d 698, 701.
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f) 2 provides, in relevant part:

2

Effective July 31, 2015, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) was renumbered as I.C.R. 33(f).
This amendment did not change the language of this subsection, which was
substantively amended in 2012. See 4/23/14 Order "In Re: Amendment of Idaho
Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 33."
7

The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the
defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant
willfully violated a condition of probation.
Therefore, the plain language of I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest a district court of its
authority to revoke a defendant's probation unless the court finds that the defendant
willfully violated a condition of his probation. Prior to the 2012 amendment to this
rule which added this requirement, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that where a
defendant's probation violations were not willful, a district court could still chose to
revoke probation, but only after first considering "whether adequate alternative
methods of punishing the defendant [were] available." State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho
378, 381-383, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340-1342 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Bearden v. Georgia,
461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983)).
In this case, the state's second report of probation violation alleged that Barth
violated his probation by: (1) possessing a pipe with a burnt residue and a baggie
containing a green leafy substance, both of which tested positive for synthetic
cannabis;

(2)

being

discharged

from

required

sex

offender treatment for

inappropriately touching a staff member; and (3) possessing a knife in his living
facility. (R., pp.184-194.) On appeal, Barth contends that the district court erred by
failing to apply I.C.R. 33(f) with respect to the second allegation pertaining to his
discharge from sex offender treatment, and by instead applying the standard from
Lafferty. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-22.)
Barth's claim fails for several reasons.

First, Barth's claim that the district

court erred with respect to the second probation violation allegation is moot because
Barth admitted committing a willful probation violation with respect to the first
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probation violation allegation, that he possessed synthetic cannabis. Because Barth
made this admission, the district court had authority to revoke his probation pursuant
to 1.C.R. 33(f) notwithstanding the district court's disposition of his second probation
violation allegation.

Second, while the district court did not expressly conclude

whether Barth's discharge from sex offender treatment constituted a willful probation
violation, a review of the record reveals substantial evidence that the discharge was
based upon Barth's own willful conduct. Thus, this second violation also justified the
district court's revocation of probation pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f).

Finally, even if

Barth's probation violations were not willful, Barth is still not entitled to relief because
the district court had authority under a number of statutes to revoke Barth's
probation, regardless of whether the violations were willful.
1.

Barth's Challenge To The District Court's Determinations Regarding
His Discharge From Sex Offender Treatment Is Moot

"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief." State v. Barclay,
149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted). The mootness doctrine
precludes review when "the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v.
Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting
Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429,432, 816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991)).
When considering whether a probation violation was willful, the Idaho
appellate courts review the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists
to show a willful violation. See, M.,., State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d
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1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 530-531, 20 P.3d 709,
714-715 (Ct. App. 2001); Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 381,870 P.2d at 1340.
In this case, notwithstanding the district court's disposition of the probation
violation allegation relating to Barth's discharge from sex offender treatment, the
court was entitled to revoke Barth's probation pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f) because Barth
admitted committing a willful probation violation with respect to the first probation
violation allegation, that Barth possessed synthetic cannabis.

Prior to the

evidentiary hearing, the following exchange between Barth and the district court
occurred:
District Court:

All right, then, sir. To the allegation in Count I, that
you violated agreement of supervision rule number
nine, on or about March 31, 2014, by possessing a
pipe with a green leafy substance that tested positive
for Spice, do you admit or deny that allegation?

Barth:

I admit to it.

District Court:

And are the allegations correct that you did indeed
possess a pipe with that substance that tested for
Spice?

Barth:

I did.

District Court:

And were you aware of the agreement of supervision
number nine, rule number nine, that required that you
not be in possession of such substances or
paraphernalia while on probation?

Barth:

I do.

(6/24/14 Tr., p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.12.)
Additionally, in support of its report of probation violation, the state submitted
a probable cause affidavit which indicated that Barth told the officer who recovered
the pipe and synthetic cannabis that he knew of the nature of the substance and had
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previously smoked it. (R., pp.186-191.) Barth has not alleged, either below or on
appeal, that his possession of the pipe and the synthetic cannabis did not constitute
a willful probation violation.

Because Barth willfully violated his probation by

possessing synthetic cannabis, the district court had authority to revoke his
probation pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f) regardless of the district court's disposition of the
probation violation allegation pertaining to his discharge from sex offender treatment.
Barth's claim that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard with respect to
this allegation is therefore moot.
2.

Barth's Discharge From Sex Offender Treatment Constituted A Willful
Probation Violation

Even if Barth's claim is not moot, it still fails. Even assuming that I.C.R. 33(f)
divested the district court of its authority to revoke Barth's probation absent the
finding of a willful violation, Barth cannot show that the district court ultimately erred
in revoking his probation because there is substantial evidence in the record that
Barth's discharge from sex offender treatment was based upon willful conduct.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that
Barth violated his probation by being discharged from sex offender treatment.
(6/24/14 Tr., p.60, L.14 - p.64, L.10.) The court did not expressly determine whether
or not the violation was willful.

Instead, the district court cited Lafferty and stated

that the "willfulness question" would "come[] into play" in the context of its
subsequent determinations regarding whether Barth's probation should be revoked,
and, if probation was revoked, what sentence should be entered. (6/24/14 Tr., p.64,
L.17 - p.66, L.12.) While the district court deferred its willfulness determination, it
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did conclude that Barth was discharged from treatment because of his misconduct.
(6/24/14

, p.63, L.8 - p.64,

8.)

At the subsequent disposition hearing, the district court did not expressly
revisit the "willfulness question," or expressly apply the standard from either Lafferty
or 1.C.R. 33(f).

(See generally 10/7/14 Tr.)

Instead, the district court elected to

revoke Barth's probation due to Barth's repeated failures to succeed on probation in
various different housing and treatment placements. (10/7/14 Tr., p.93, L.10 - p.1O2,
L.7.) There is no indication in the record that that the district court ultimately applied
the Lafferty standard, determined that Barth's discharge from treatment was not
willful, but then revoked probation anyway.
To the contrary, substantial evidence in the record indicates that the violation
was willful. At the evidentiary hearing, Barth's probation officer testified that the sex

offender treatment provider discharged Barth from treatment.

(6/24/14 Tr., p.18,

L.18 - p.20, L.5.) The state submitted a March 2014 letter from Barth's treatment
provider which stated:
Please accept this letter as notification that I am discharging Mr. Barth
from sexual offender treatment, effective immediately. I have come to the
decision to do so after contemplation of his reported ongoing difficulties in
maintaining his boundaries with staff at Rigby Country Living and other
persons wherein he continues to antagonize or otherwise engage in
inappropriate hugging, touching, etc.
I am aware of multiple staff
disciplinary actions at the above mentioned facility stemming from Mr.
Barth's behavior, as well as multiple police responses to the facility
relative to Mr. Barth's behavior. It is my expectation as a condition of
treatment, that offenders will maintain appropriate social behavior and
boundaries as well as comply with all probation conditions. I have met
with him on four occasions since beginning January 30th to the present
time. Our sessions have largely been consumed in de-escalating Mr.
Barth's anger and complaints, and have been relatively unproductive in
dealing with sexual offender treatment issues. It is my opinion that Mr.
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Barth is unlikely to benefit from further treatment at this office at this time
due to his emotional and behavioral limitations.
(6/24/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-14; PSI, p.6.)

While subsequent materials submitted by Barth in support of his disposition
argument indicated that Barth's "emotional and behavioral" issues played a role in
his discharge from treatment (PSI, pp.7-8), those materials were not inconsistent
with the March 2014 letter submitted by the state, and together, these documents
provided substantial evidence that it was Barth's disciplinary issues and misconduct
which ultimately led to his discharge. The fact that Barth's willful misconduct may
have arose from his neurological issues is not ultimately relevant to the question of
whether he willfully violated his probation. Thus, even assuming that 1.C.R. 33(f)
divested the district court of its authority to revoke Barth's probation absent the
finding of a willful violation, Barth has failed to show error because the record
demonstrates that his violations were, in fact, willful.
3.

The Court Acted Consistently With Governing Legal Standards In
Revoking Barth's Probation, Regardless of Whether The Violations
Were Willful

As discussed above, I. C.R. 33(f) purports to preclude a district court from its
authority to revoke a defendant's probation unless it finds that the defendant willfully
violated a condition of his probation. However, the authority of a trial court to revoke
probation is also governed by several statutes.

Among them, I.C. § 20-222(2)

provides, in relevant part:
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court
may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested.
Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be
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executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court may revoke a defendant's
probation when the defendant has violated "any of the conditions of probation." I.C.
§ 20-222 (emphasis added). The statute does not contain any requirement that that
the violation be "willful." Rather, the only limitation on the court's authority to revoke
probation imposed by this statute is that there actually be a violation of one or more
conditions of probation.
Idaho Code §§ 19-2602 and 19-2603 similarly grant trial courts broad
authority to revoke probation. In fact, pursuant to those statutes, a court's "authority
to revoke the probation does not even depend upon [a] violation of any of the terms
or conditions of the order." Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 482, 253 P.2d 794, 798
(1953), quoted in Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 297, 392 P.2d 552, 554 (1964).
Idaho Code § 19-2602 authorizes a district court to "issue a bench warrant for the
rearrest of the defendant" where "it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the
terms and conditions upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the
court ... have been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court." Further,
"[w]hen the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of
probation," Idaho Code§ 19-2603 provides that the court "may, if judgment has been
withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if
judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation."
Consistent with the plain language of I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222,
Idaho's appellate courts have recognized that the trial courts of this state have
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statutory authority to revoke probation in two circumstances: "(1) [upon] satisfactory
proof of a violation of a probation condition, or (2) [for] 'any other cause satisfactory
to court." State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (citing I.C.

§§ 19-2602 and 20-222), quoted in State v. Buzo, 121 Idaho 324, 326, 824 P.2d 899,
900 (Ct. App. 1991 ); see also Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 P.2d at 554; Ex pa rte
Medley, 73 Idaho at 482, 253 P.2d at 798-99; State v. Hancock,111 Idaho 835, 727
P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1986). It is true that Idaho's appellate courts have held that a
trial court must consider alternatives to imprisonment before revoking a defendant's
probation based on a violation that is "not willful, or was beyond the probationer's
control."

Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37.

However, nothing in the

relevant statutes actually prevents a trial court from revoking probation where the
violation or other "cause satisfactory to the court" was not willful.
As discussed above, the plain language of I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest a
district court of its authority to revoke a defendant's probation unless it finds that the
defendant willfully violated a condition of his probation. The requirement is of no
effect, however, because it directly conflicts with the broad authority to revoke
probation granted by I.C. §§ 19-2602, 9-2603 and 20-222, and because a court's
authority to revoke probation is a matter of substantive, not procedural, law.
"When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way
that results in a conflict." State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 706, 709, 228 P.3d 387,
390 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916
(2008)). However, in this case, it simply is not possible to reasonably interpret I.C.R.
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33(f) in a way that does not conflict with I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222.
Pursuant to the rule, a trial court "shall not revoke probation unless ... the defendant
willfully violated a condition of probation." I.C.R. 33(f). The statutes, on the other
hand, give the court broad authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of
"any" of the probation conditions or "for any other cause satisfactory to the court."
I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, 20-222.
Because it is not possible to reconcile the rule and the statutes, "this Court
must determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance."
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; see also State v. Currington, 108 Idaho
539, 540-41, 700 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at
391. "Substantive law issues are the province of the legislature, while matters of
rulemaking and procedure are generally the province of the judiciary." Two Jinn, 148
Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 390 (citing Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916;
State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 654, 534 P.2d 771, 77 4 (1975)). Thus, if the conflict
between a statute and a criminal rule relates to matters of procedure, the criminal
rule will prevail. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (citing State v. Beam,
121 Idaho 862, 863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992)); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228
P.3d at 390. "Conversely, in matters of substantive law, the statute applies." Two
Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709-10, 228 P.3d at 390-91 (citing Beam, 121 Idaho at 864, 828
P.2d at 893).
In determining whether a conflict relates to matters of substantive law or,
instead, to matters of procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the
following general guidelines:
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Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and
punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines,
and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and
procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of
the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are
effectuated.
Currington, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 67 4,
676-77 (Wash. 1974)); accord Beam, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93;
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 710,228 P.3d at
391.
Applying these guidelines in Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court determined
that any conflict between I.C.R. 7(b) - which requires a charging document to allege
the "essential facts constituting the offense charged" - and I.C. § 19-1430 - which
abolished the distinction between accessories and principals such that "no other
facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are required
in an indictment against his principal" - was a matter of substantive law. Johnson,
145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17. Specifically, the Court explained:
The Legislature's definition of principal and abolishment of the
distinction between principal and accessories does not pertain
to mechanical operations of the courts; the Legislature is
creating, defining, and regulating primary rights. Thus, I.C. §
19-1430 is substantive and does not overlap with this Court's
power to create procedural rules. Therefore, even if I. C. § 191430 and I.C.R. 7(b) were in conflict, the statute would prevail.
Johnson,145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17.
Similarly, in Beam, the Court held that a statute requiring a defendant in a
death penalty case to file a challenge to his or sentence within 42 days prevailed
over I.C.R. 35, which permits a challenge to an illegal sentence at any time. Beam,
121 Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893.

The Court reasoned that, given the unique
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nature of the death penalty, the statute "creates, defines, and regulates a primary
rights" and, as such, was a matter of substantive law.

l!t

Like the statutes at issue in Johnson and Beam, the statutes granting trial
courts authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of any of the conditions
of probation or "for any other cause satisfactory to the court" are substantive in
nature.

It is well settled that probation, itself, "is not a matter of right; it may be

granted the defendant through exercise of sound discretion by the trial court within
the ambit of authority conferred by the legislature." Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392
P.2d at 554. Because a trial court's power to place a defendant on probation only
exists as a function of the legislature's power to enact substantive law, it follows that
a court's authority to revoke probation is likewise a matter exclusively within the
province of the legislature. See

kl

at 300-301, 392 P.2d at 557 (citations omitted)

("The legislatures of the several states have the exclusive and inherent power to
define, prohibit and punish any act as a crime within the limits of the federal and
respective state constitutions.").

Indeed, a review of Idaho Code §§ 19-2602, 19-

2603 and 20-222 shows they do not merely prescribe the mechanical procedure a
court must follow in revoking probation. Instead, they actually define and regulate
the circumstances under which a legislatively authorized grant of probation may be
revoked.
Because the authority of a court to revoke probation is a matter of substantive
law, the statutes granting the trial courts of this state that authority must '"be given
due deference and respect," Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (quoting !n
re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995)).
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Accordingly, to the extent I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest trial courts of the authority
granted to them by the legislature to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of
any probation condition or for "any other cause satisfactory to the court," the rule is
of no effect. In light of Barth's violation of express conditions of his probation, the
district court had authority under I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222 to revoke
Bath's probation, regardless of whether the violations were willful.

D.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Declining To Reinstate
Barth On Probation And Into The Custody Of The Proposed Treatment and
Housing Program
Barth contends that the district court erred because, he asserts, it was not

aware that it had the discretion to tailor the terms of probation to Barth's individual
needs. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-22.) Barth has failed to demonstrate that the district
court abused its discretion.
At the disposition hearing, Barth's counsel acknowledged that, based upon
the relevant evaluations and Barth's struggles on probation to that point, Barth was
"not going to make it in group treatment." (10/7/14 Tr., p.79, Ls.3-16.) Therefore,
through the testimony of treatment provider Ebony Jorgensen, Barth proposed an
alternative treatment and housing arrangement in which Barth would reside in a twobedroom home with one other resident, and would follow a "service plan" with the
assistance of a single staff member in a one-on-one environment. (10/7/14 Tr., p.31,
L.19 - p.37, L.4.)
The district court declined to place Barth on probation and into the custody of
this proposed program. (10/7/14 Tr., p.93, L.10 - p.102, L.7.) Before making this
determination, the district court reviewed the relevant evaluations and other
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evidence.

(10/7/14 Tr., p.93, L.22 - p.94, L.5.) The court summarized the course of

proceedings and Barth's repeated failures to succeed in various housing and
treatment programs made available to him to that point. (10/7/14 Tr., p.96, L.17 p.98, L.9.)
With respect to the proposed one-on-on treatment plan, the district court did
not indicate that it believed it lacked the discretion to reinstate Barth on probation
into the custody of the proposed program.

Instead, the court expressed a belief that

such a placement would not ultimately be effective, and was contrary to broader
goals of probation and community supervision. The court explained:
You are, if on probation, placed in a system that is there to manage
public safety, provide and hopefully obtain rehabilitation, and all the same
while helping you hopefully to become somewhat of a better person. But I
can't, and I don't -- I can't strap the jail, I can't strap probation and parole,
with some type of a notion that they have to do an individual plan for you
while supervising you on probation. You have a set of rules; you either
follow or you don't. You either show up to your meetings or you don't.
You engage in treatment, or you don't.

It's a sex offense where you have been given two shots at probation. It's a
sex offense where you failed your last effort at counseling, not group but
one-on-one, with Blair Gardner. I found that as a matter of law in the last
hearing, where we had the evidentiary. And so to now think, well, but let's
try something else, not in a group, because you can't do that, but let's try
some more one-on-one, and not with a bunch of people, because you
don't like that, and pretty soon, it becomes that you want to make the
probation fit your needs or fit your desires, where it's not really designed to
do that.
Probations are designed to say, you can go to prison, or you can go
and compete these rules and keep them and monitor them.
(10/7/14 Tr., p.96, Ls.4-16; p.98, L.22- p.99, L.15.)
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Essentially, it appears that the court was concerned that continuing to
narrowly tailor Barth's probation to his own specific needs and preferences in light of
Barth's repeated failures to comply with previous probation conditions defeated the
very purpose of probation.

In other words, if a defendant is only capable of

succeeding on probation if he can choose his own probationary terms, then he is not
truly a candidate for a probation that will prepare him to live safely within the
community.
The district court was not required to place Barth on probation and into the
custody of the proposed housing and treatment program just because this option
was presented to it. Instead, the court was entitled to utilize its discretion to consider
all of the evidence before it, including Barth's prior history on probation, and to
evaluate the proposed program and determine whether Barth's enrollment in it would
ultimately achieve the goals of rehabilitation, and was consistent with the protection
of society.
On appeal, Barth cites Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 315, 658 P.2d 983,
986 (Ct. App. 1983), which holds that "the [sentencing] process must, therefore, be
an individual consideration of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
offense." (Appellant's brief, p.21.) In this case, there is no indication that the district
court refused to consider Barth's individual facts or circumstances. To the contrary,
through Barth's various housing and treatment placements, evaluations, and
reinstatement on probation after a previous violation, the district court was clearly
well-aware of Barth's individual circumstances, and was willing to attempt to identify
a probation scenario within which Barth could succeed.
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At the disposition hearing,

the court summarized, "I have on a more individualized basis, I think than most, tried
to extend to you the efforts of working with you, with your individual needs and
circumstances. In fact, I think to be fair to the state, they were on board with this up
until this latest violation." (10/7/14 Tr. p.97, L.25 - p.98, L.6.)
Barth has failed to demonstrate that the district court's decision not to
reinstate him on probation and into the custody of the proposed housing and
treatment program constituted an abuse of discretion. This Court should therefore
affirm the district court's order revoking probation and ordering the original sentence
executed.

11.
Barth Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His I.C.R. 35
Motion For Reduction Of Sentence
A.

Introduction
Barth contends that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for

reduction of sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.) A review of the record reveals
that the district court acted well within its discretion in declining to place Barth back
on probation, or to otherwise reduce his sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and

the Court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.

State v.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838,840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Barth
must show that the sentence imposed upon revocation of his probation was
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"excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."

C.

kl

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion By Denying
Barth's I.C.R. 35 Motion
Approximately two weeks after the district court entered its order revoking

Barth's probation, Barth filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
pp.258-278.)

(R,

Attached to the motion was a document entitled "Safer Options

Manual: A Road Map to Treatment and Community Safety." (R., pp.262-278.) The
document described a treatment program designed for offenders with intellectual
disabilities and problematic sexual behavior. (Id.) In the motion, Barth asserted that
the described programming would be made available to him should the district court
reinstate him on probation and into the custody of the housing and treatment
program proposed at the disposition hearing. (R., p.259.)
The district court denied the motion. (R., pp.279-282.)

The court noted that

it had already declined to place Barth into the custody of a program "closely
resembling the program now presented to the court," and that the submitted
information regarding the new programing "[did] not change the court's decision
regarding the defendant's disposition." (R., pp.281-282.)
Barth has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion.
The information attached to the I.C.R. 35 motion merely supplemented the testimony
presented in support of the housing and treatment program proposed by Barth at the
disposition hearing.

Nothing contained within these documents required the district
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court to change its decision not to reinstate Barth on probation. This Court should
therefore affirm the district court's order denying the motion.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
revoking probation and executing the sentence previously imposed upon Barth's
conviction for felony injury to child, and also affirm the district court's order denying
Barth's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2015.

MARK W. OLSON ~
Deputy Attorney General
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